This paper challenges the assumption that lines, colors, and shapes have aesthetic effects that are the same for everyone. From an interdisciplinary perspective of art history and empirical aesthetics, we argue that assigning aesthetic effects to specific lines or colors may well be a valid theory for some aesthetic encounters, it falls short of explaining universal aesthetic effects. Our analysis proceeds in four steps: We begin by reconsidering the notion of aesthetic effect as defined in the tradition of Goethe. We (...) then demonstrate that doubts regarding the universality of aesthetic effects have existed since the nineteenth century and that the concept of aesthetic sensitivity was introduced around 1900 to account for individual differences. We point to the persistence of the idea of universality and, related to this, sensitivity by considering the ›Visual Aesthetic Sensitivity Test‹, first developed in the 1960s by Karl Otto Götz, Daniel Berlyne, and Hans-Jürgen Eysenck. We discuss new empirical research testing interpersonal agreement about aesthetic effects. The findings of these studies indicate a low agreement among the participants about aesthetic effects, raising serious doubts about assumed universality. In a concluding section, we discuss what remains of the universality claim and propose a weak theory of intersubjective agreement about aesthetic effects. (shrink)

Der Titel meines Vortrags bezieht sich nicht auf heftige Auseinandersetzungen in der heutigen Hegelrezeption, sondern auf den gleichnamigen Abschnitt der Phänomenologie des Geistes von 1807: “Das geistige Tierreich und der Betrug oder die Sache selbst.” Dieser verhältnismäßig wenig beachtete und womöglich noch weniger verstandene Abschnitt ist meines Erachtens einer der wichtigsten im ganzen Buch. Ich möchte deshalb heute versuchen seine Bedeutung etwas aufzuklären.

This article is concerned with the nature of Socratic refutation.Over fifty years agon ow, Richard Robinson argued that Plato‘s Socrates assumes that his refutations show an interlocutor‘s thesis, not merely to contradict other beliefs held by the interlocutor, but to be self-contradictory. At first sight,this interpretation does not seem plausible, and it would indeed be rejected by most scholars today. Nevertheless, I argue that the interpretation contains much truth: Plato‘s Socrates does, if not always, then at least sometimes think of (...) his refutations in this way. In addition – and here I part company not only with Robinson‘s critics but also with Robinson himself – I argue for two further claims: first,that in thinking of his refutations in this way Socrates gives a reasonable characterization of a significant number of his refutations; and second, that it is not implausible of him to suppose that theses of the sort that he attempts to refute are in fact self-contradictory. (shrink)

Consideration of the German philosophy and political history of the past century might well give the impression, and often does give foreign observers the impression, that liberalism, including in particular commitment to the ideal of free thought and expression, is only skin-deep in Germany. Were not Heidegger's disgust at Gerede (which of course really meant the free speech of the Weimar Republic) and Gadamer's defense of "prejudice" and "tradition" more reflective of the true instincts of German philosophy than, say, the (...) Frankfurt School's heavily Anglophone-influenced championing of free thought and expression? Were not the Kaiser and Nazism more telling of Germany's real political nature than the liberalism of the Weimar Republic (a desperate, ephemeral experiment undertaken in reaction to Germany's disastrous defeat in World War I) or the liberalism of (West) Germany since 1945 (in effect forced on the country by the victorious Allies after World War II)? (shrink)

BackgroundDespite severe cognitive dysfunction in Alzheimer's disease, aesthetic preferences in AD patients seem to retain some stability over time, similarly to healthy controls. However, the underlying mechanisms of aesthetic preference stability in AD remain unclear. We therefore aimed to study the role of emotional valence of stimuli for stability of aesthetic preferences in patients with AD compared to cognitively unimpaired elderly adults.MethodsFifteen AD patients score 12–26) without visual impairment and/or psychiatric disorder, as well as 15 healthy controls without cognitive impairment (...) matched in age, sex, art interest and highest level of education were included in this study. All participants were asked to rank-order eight artworks per stimulus category according to their preference twice with a 2-week span in-between. Based on these two rankings a preference change score was calculated. In order to assess explicit recognition memory of the artworks in the second testing session, four artworks of each stimulus category used in the preference ranking task were presented together with a content-matched distractor artwork painted by the same artist. Participants had to indicate which of the stimuli they had seen 2 weeks previously.ResultsAD patients [MMSE = 18.9 ± 3.6; Age = 85.4 ± 6.9; 33.3% male] had no explicit recognition memory of the artworks, whereas healthy controls [MMSE = 27.7 ± 1.4; Age = 84.3 ± 6.7; 33.3% male] correctly recognized 85% of stimuli after 2 weeks. AD patients had equally stable preferences compared to the control group for negative artworks, but less stable preferences for positive and neutral images.ConclusionEven in cognitively impaired AD patients, aesthetic preference for negatively-valenced artworks remains relatively stable. Our study provides novel evidence that AD patients may have a somewhat preserved implicit valence system for negative compared to neutral or positive visual information, especially in the domain of aesthetics. However, more studies need to further uncover the details of the underlying neurocognitive mechanisms of preference stability in pathological aging. (shrink)